Comments on Position Limits in Commodity Markets
quoted in Federal Registry
...and that allowing owners of more than 10 percent of another entity not to
aggregate could ‘‘potentially spark additional ‘herd-like’ behavior, thus
causing another commodities futures boom-bust cycle.’’
- International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers on June 29, 2012 (‘‘CL– IAMAW’’).
Summary
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 17 CFR Part 151 ruN: 3038-AD82 AGGREGATION UNDER PART 151, POSITION LIMITS FOR FUTURES AND SWAPS.
The proposed rule would
amend the rules establishing speculative position limits for physical commodity
futures and option contracts traded on a designated contract market and
economically equivalent swaps, which were published in the Federal Register on
November 18, 2011.
The proposed rules would permit any market
participant with an ownership interest of 10% up to 50% in a separately
organized entity (an "owned entity") to make a notice filing of
exemption from aggregation by demonstrating independence in decision making.
The owned entity could be a financial or a nonfinancial entity that has passive
ownership interests.
By
loosening the ownership of interest up to 50%, the proposed rule can potentially spark additional “herd-like”
behavior, thus causing another commodities futures boom-bust cycle. We believe that without strong regulations including position limits established
by the Dodd Frank Act, excessive speculation in the futures markets will
continue. Therefore, we recommend that Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) adhere to its
existing formula of setting position limits such that no single
investor can constitute more than 10 percent of a market, as measured by open
interest, up to 25,000 contracts of open interest, and 2.5 percent thereafter. However, if CFTC’s existing position limit
formula is considered not to be feasible, then we suggest CFTC give Pollin and
Heintz (2011) and CME group (2011) position limits proposals serious
consideration.[1]
Our views are based on the analysis of the
empirical literature on position limits, excessive speculation, price
volatility and the financialization of commodities.[2]
The literature reviewed shows that institutional investors in its attempts find
“safe havens” and increase their profits entered into the commodity markets en
masse. As a result, prices became
inflated beyond the fundamentals of supply and demand (boom) and subsequent drop
in prices when many institutional investors exited the commodities market
(bust).
With the increasing presence of
institutional investors in the commodities market, it appears that index
traders (institutional investors) primarily hold long positions (buyers). Several economists show that from a sheer
size perspective the number of index traders tend to be small, however, “their
average long positions is very large…sometimes more than 10 times the size of
an average long positions held by either commercial or non-commercial traders. A
direct consequence is that index traders can have strong financial power to
influence prices. As a result, speculative bubbles may form and price changes
can no longer be interpreted as reflecting fundamental supply and demand signals”
(Mayer 2009).
A policy response to guard against
excessive speculation is for the CFTC “to exercise its
authority to ensure that the policy tools provided by Dodd-Frank are
implemented in ways that protect the interests of ordinary people and small businesses
throughout the United States (Pollin and Heintz 2011:5). Specifically, Section 737 of the Dodd Frank Act mandates that
CFTC institute position limits in order
to “diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation.” Thus, from the existing studies, reports and
articles cited, it is clear that position limits are needed in the commodities
market.[3]
As mentioned previously, we believe that the existing rules are reasonable and sound. The proposed rule as written deviates from
the intended purpose as instructed in the Dodd Frank Act. Although
not a panacea to end all excessive speculation, position limits can be another
tool in the tool box.
[1] Pollin
and Heintz (2011) and CME Group (2011)
[2]
See our analyses in Appendix A.
[3]
See Appendix B.
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